Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger (Phys. Rev. Lett. 83(17) (2001) 3354) have claimed that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information (...) measure, I(p), with regard to the definition of a notion of ''total information content.'' This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship between individual measures of information and notions of ''total information content'' investigated. We close by considering the prospects of Zeilinger's Foundational Principle as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The principal aims of this study are to compare the positions of Fichte and Marx, particularly with respect to the concept of "activity," and concurrently "to contribute to a reconceptualization" of the nineteenth century German philosophical tradition. In the seventh chapter we learn in effect that Fichte’s influence on Marx is, from a historical standpoint, barely traceable. Some of Marx’s Fichteanism may be attributable to Fichte’s influence on the Young Hegelians, and in turn their influence on Marx.

The thesis of this book is "that we can meaningfully speak of the task of the Phenomenology; that there is a single coherent argument running through its entirety; and that when properly understood, the Preface can be seen not only as complementary to the Introduction but as growing directly out of it". Specifically, W. wants to show that the "epistemological" and "historical" sides of the PhG are compatible in that the former is finally grounded in the latter. Theoretical-scientific consciousness is (...) not autonomous. History is the development of Geist through man’s work, strife, desires, thought; i.e., W. endorses a "humanistic interpretation" of "Spirit". That this is a "left-Hegelian" approach is clear. Although W. is careful to point out the deficiencies in Marx’s and Feuerbach’s critiques of Hegel, with respect to the foundational role of the "socially-historically conditioned aspect" of man, for example, we find that Marx and Hegel are in agreement. And we are told that Feuerbach’s conception of God is actually not so different from Hegel’s. For both, God is a kind of human "projection". W. defends this psychological concept as a "model for understanding Hegel’s view of religion," so long as it is remembered that this must be a "collective projection". These projections are not simply illusions since they reveal something true about human nature. But there is no transcendent Spirit for Hegel. To speak of Spirit as "absolute" is simply to refer to the transcendence of society to the individual. Thus the argument of the PhG in chapters 6 and 7 "could easily be described as atheism and communism," with the reservations that the "divine" exists in the form of man and that private property is not to be abolished. (shrink)

This work contains ten essays published by Spaemann between 1965 and 1975, as well as an exchange between Spaemann and J. Habermas concerning one of the essays. Another of the essays, "Remarks on the Problem of Equality," is accessible in translation ; this essay embodies many of the themes discussed by Spaemann in the other pieces reprinted in the book. In the introduction written for the book, Spaemann summarizes the theme common to the essays: "It is always a question of (...) rational objections against the abstract utopia of radical-emancipatory rule of reason.... The thesis of this book is that this utopia is irrational". The irrationality consists both in the assumption that economic scarcity can be abolished and in the assumption that perfect social and individual rationality will be implemented at a future date, but is at present accessible only to the revolutionary vanguard which has appointed itself as the representative of the ideal. The fact that the majority of the populace does not consent to the revolutionaries’ ideal, much less tactics, is then perceived by the revolutionaries as proof that the majority is "immature" or "sick." Spaemann cannot be said to have demonstrated the falsity of the first assumption. The bulk of his essays is channeled into multiform attacks on the second assumption. Spaemann shows, to my mind successfully, that in practice the unrestrained passion for justice results, in a "dialectical" way, in injustice. In this context Spaemann criticizes liberation theology, as well as reliance on conscience as a basis for political action. In essence the same observation about the dangers of the passion for justice is made, as Spaemann knows well, by Plato’s Republic. The classical conception of restrained and tolerant rule in a regimen mixtum is superior to the fanaticism and totalitarianism which results from the passion just referred to. Spaemann finds the modern theoretical basis of the utopian "emancipation" doctrine articulated by Marx. (shrink)